We apply synthetic control methods to study the long-term consequences of the interventionist and collectivist reforms implemented by the Peruvian military junta of 1968-1975. We compare long-term outcomes for the Peruvian economy following the radical reforms of the early 1970s with those of two controls made of similar countries, one chosen in the Latin American region and another one chosen from the world at large. We find that the economic legacy of the junta includes sizable loses in GDP along two decades, beyond those that can be attributed to adverse international circumstances. The evidence suggests that those loses can be attributed both to a decline in capital accumulation and to a fall in productivity.
Introduction
The Peruvian military junta, presided by General Velasco from 1968 to 1975, represents a very unusual experiment in economic policy. The military engaged in a wide range of reforms restructuring ownership of economic assets in favor of the public sector and generally increasing the role of the state in the economy. Underpinning the policies was the belief-commonly associated with Latin American nationalism and populism-in the ability of a reform-minded state to orient business activity toward national goals and to eliminate foreign dependence via the adoption of command-and-control policies, including state-managed foreign trade. What is peculiar of the episode is that the military were able to implement the reforms untrammeled by institutional, political or legal constraints. 1 Moreover, the reforms were expected to be longlasting, and to some extent they succeeded in being so, at least until pro-market reforms in the 1990s. Thus, the episode is a test-case for the economic policy recommendations of Latin American state-centered nationalist and populist creeds.
In this paper, we evaluate the long-term consequences of Velasco's reforms on GDP per capita, capital stock per capita, and total factor productivity. In particular, we compare the performance of the Peruvian economy with that of two synthetic controls made of similar countries-one chosen in Latin America and the other in the world at large. The idea of the controls is to isolate the e↵ects of the policies from those of the changing international circumstances. From 1975, Peru, like other Latin American and developing economies, su↵ered almost two decades of declining terms of trade. In the 1980s, the region was shocked again by the drying out of international lending. Indeed, both synthetic controls exhibit stagnating GDP and capital stock per capita, and either stagnating or declining TFP, since the 1980s.
The Peruvian economy does considerably worse than both controls in all cases. That is, the performance of the country under adverse circumstances was greatly hindered by the extent of state intervention in the economy that resulted from Velasco's reforms.
The synthetic control method was introduced in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) in the 1 In fact, Velasco's regime was dubbed by social scientists as the "Peruvian experiment" (Lowenthal 1975; Mc-Clintock and Lowenthal 1983; Aguirre and Drinot 2017) by the combination of very radical reforms implemented in fast succession by a government with an extraordinary degree of autonomy from society.
context of a study on the economic cost of conflict, and it was extended in Abadie et al. (2010) and Becker and Klößner (2018a) . It has been used to study, among others, the e↵ects of economic liberalization (Billmeier and Nannicini 2013) , the economic e↵ects of natural disasters (Cavallo et al. 2013) and, closer to this paper, the economic consequences of Hugo Chavez regime (Grier and Maynard 2016) . The contrast with the case of Chavez is interesting. Grier and Maynard (2016) finds that the nationalist military regime of Chavez did worse than the controls while enjoying an export price boom, while we find that the economy under Velasco and his successors performed worse than the controls under unfavorable export prices. 2 In both cases, the economic consequences have been bleak.
Velasco took power in 1968, after deposing an elected president who did not deliver on his campaign promises about land reform and a nationalist stance regarding a particularly irksome foreign oil enclave. 3 Velasco's regime ended in turn in 1975 with a palace coup, motivated in part by the deteriorating health of the dictator and in part by a looming balance-of-payments crisis. 4 The successor military junta nominally shared the revolutionary project, but got bogged down by the crisis. Political power was transferred back to elected civilians in 1980-actually to the same president deposed by the military in 1968. Yet, there were important elements of continuity in economic regime under the successor elected administrations. Economic decision making remained in the hands of an expansive bureaucracy in public enterprises and government agencies. 5 A half-hearted attempt at trade liberalization was abandoned in the early 1980s. 6 A change in economic regime only came after the market-oriented reforms of the 1990s.
We use 1968-1975, 1968-1985, and 1968-1990 as alternative periods of analysis. The first one corresponds to the period of reforms under General Velasco. The second considers as well the successor military junta and the democratically elected administration that followed (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) . The third one includes the "heterodox" democratically elected Garcia administration 2 According to Gott (2005, p. 95) , Chavez visited Peru in 1974 as a young cadet, and claimed to have been inspired by the Peruvian example.
3 See the semi-o cial account of the coup by Zimmermann (1975) . 4 Zapata (2018) . 5 Lowenthal (1983) , for instance, refers to the Peruvian state as "one of the strongest in Latin America." Fitzgerald (1983) calculates that the share of the corporate sector owned by the government or cooperatives was around 43% by 1975, with 40% in the hands of domestic private business and the rest in the hands of foreign firms.
6 See Nogues (1986) . (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) ; this last choice is admittedly controversial since Garcia administration embarked in extreme fiscal and monetary mismanagement. 7 We find that GDP losses associated with the change in economic regime were around 10% by 1975, 30% by 1980 and 1985 up to 50% of GDP by 1990 using either the Latin American or the world synthetic control. The gap with respect to the synthetic controls can be attributed both to lower productivity and slower capital accumulation. In terms of productivity, the loss in TFP was between 10% by the years 1980 and 1985 and reached 30% by 1990. In term of capital accumulation, the loss in capital stock per capita reaches 30% in 1980 to 1990. These performance results are stronger in the robustness case where we use a larger set of control countries.
We focus the analysis on the long term implications of Velasco's regime on economic growth, investment, and productivity. Of course, these are not the only metrics of interest. Some of the reforms implemented by the regime, and in particular land reform, were in the wish list of the major political parties before the 1968 coup and were likely very popular. The political regime before the 1968 coup was far from a full-fledged democracy. The electoral franchise was restricted to those deemed literate, but political representation was based on total population, which gave a strong hand to landed interests in the legislative. The concentration of land property was the historical result of the despoliation of the peasantry. When a new constitution was drafted by an elected assembly in 1978-1979 the old franchise restrictions were left firmly in the past. Indeed, one of the motivations of the junta was breaking the political and economic power of the traditional oligarchic families which were popularly perceived as a barrier to the modernization of the country. This was arguably accomplished.
One can trace a parallel between the politics of the state-centered reforms of 1968-1975 and the market-oriented reforms of the early 1990s. In both cases, the formal political institutions of the country were unable to process in a legal manner changes in the economic regime which at the time appeared urgent. 8 A politically negotiated reform process, respecting the constitution, would have made for a less clean experiment but would have likely eliminated some of the worse economic follies associated to the expansion of the role of the state in the economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we discuss the economic reforms of Velasco's regime, as well as their persistence through the 1970s and 1980s. In section three we summarize the synthetic control approach as applied in this paper. In section four we describe our data, empirical design, and estimated controls. In section five we present our results. In section six we explain the robustness exercise and in section seven we gather concluding remarks.
The Peruvian Revolution
General Velasco took power in Peru as head of a military junta in October 3 of 1968, after deposing an elected president and disbanding the congress. Peruvian military were disappointed with respect to the government stance regarding a foreign oil firm which notoriously managed an oil-rich area as an enclave. 9 They were disappointed also about the slow pace of the land reform, promised by the civilian administration but perennially blocked or diluted in congress. 10
In October 9, the government expropriated and occupied the disputed oil fields. The military junta soon announced their aim of e↵ecting a "vast process of transformation" with the purpose of ending Peru's "structural disequilibrium" and "foreign dependence." 11
The diagnosis of Peru's troubles and the reforms embraced by the military junta were inspired by military nationalism, by traditional Latin American structuralism, which prescribed land reform and industry promotion as means to eliminate internal "structural" barriers to growth, and by the "dependency school," a branch of Marxian thought in vogue in Latin America in the 1960s, which emphasized the deleterious e↵ects of foreign ownership of assets on resource allocation decisions. 12 There was at the time a general interventionist spirit among development economists and practioners; the Little's report (Arthur D. Little, Inc. 1960 ), for instance, recommended an active industrial policy, making use of selective tari↵s. 9 Cotler (2018) discusses the ideological changes in the military that preceded the coup. 10 Land reform was a historic demand of the left in Peru. Mariátegui (1928) , for instance, considered that land reform should have been part of a liberal, capitalist transformation of Peru, that nonetheless had not happened. In the 1960s, belief in the need of a land reform in precisely that sense was widely shared in development circles (see e.g. Alianza para el Progreso 1961) .
11 Velasco Alvarado (1972), speech to the 1969 meeting of CEPAL (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean).
12 See e.g. Thorp and Bertram (1978, pp. 10-13) .
The economic regime embraced by the military was described by a sympathetic economist as "state capitalism." In his words, Historically, the process of transforming an export-led economy based on natural resources to one based on industry serving domestic markets requires an extensive restructuring of capital, involving change not only in the pattern of production (sectoral balance, input use, and so on) but also in the ownership of assets on the one hand and in the relationship between capital and labor on the other.
. . .
By "state capitalism" in this context we mean that the state takes responsibility for organizing production and accumulation in the modern sector of the economy and that public ownership replaces private ownership in key branches. (Fitzgerald 1983, p. 67) Unlike other nationalist-military episodes in Latin America, such as Peron in Argentina or Chavez in Venezuela, Velasco's regime never enjoyed organized popular support. The junta shunned "the false participation" of traditional political parties, and professed a belief in the "unity between people and armed forces." 13 Reforms were introduced by decree, without any e↵ective opposition. The military tolerated very little dissent, going to the length of confiscating most of the press. The relative autonomy of the regime relative to the society is one of the salient characteristics of the "Peruvian experiment" with revolution-from-above.
We summarize the reforms and their persistence after Velasco's regime in (1982) . 18 In Nogues's (1986) account, trade liberalization in the 1980s was attempted in an economy ridden with distortions and by a government with very little commitment toward it. Starting in 1969, the military implemented a wave of nationalizations, including a takeover of most of the banking sector, the nationalization of major foreign oil and mining interests, and the nationalization of telecommunications, electricity and water services-all of them considered strategic sectors by the military. Large state-owned enterprises were introduced in each sector.
A bad "El Niño" year and overfishing led to a crisis in the fishing industry in 1973; the response by the military junta was to nationalize the entire sector and create a state-owned enterprise with legal monopoly status. The nationalization of some TV channels and newspapers in 1970 and the nationalization of all remaining mass media in 1974 was likely primarily motivated by the desire to stifle dissent, and it was reversed as soon as power was returned to civilians.
State-owned enterprises created by the military junta in the "strategic" sectors, just like extensive state intervention in foreign trade, were going to be a lasting legacy. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the expansion of state-owned enterprises in the aftermath of Velasco's reforms. 21
Privatizations of most of these state owned-enterprises happened during the 1990s. 22
The synthetic control approach
In assessing the long-term e↵ects of the military junta's reforms, the main problem is to define a counterfactual. The synthetic control method, introduced in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended in Abadie et al. (2010) and Becker and Klößner (2018a) , provides a way around this di culty. Under this approach, a synthetic control is obtained by means of weighted 19 Abusada (1977) . 20 The education reform undertaken by the military in 1972 also had an important utopian element. It intended to create a "new type of man" and "raise political awareness" (Salazar Bondy 1975). On a positive note, it also attempted to revalorize Peruvian indigenous languages and to use them in public education. It was resisted by teachers and parents, and rolled back in 1982.
21 Revenues and costs of state-owned enterprises are expressed as percentage of GDP for comparison purposes, though a more precise measurement of the size of the state in the economy would require to estimate the value added of state-owned enterprises. Of course, such calculation is fraught with di culties. 22 As seen in the figures, both revenues and expenditures of state-owned enterprises started shrinking before the privatizations, as a result of the hyperinflation (Martinelli and Vega 2018) . The disorderly retreat of the state from the economy is described by Webb (1991) . Source: Martinelli and Vega (2018) .
combination of J potential control countries. It is essential that the synthetic control approaches the treated unit in terms of the pre-treatment values. Following the notation of Abadie et al.
(2010), if J + 1 units (countries) are observed, the first unit is the treated country exposed to the policies, while others remain isolated to the policy and called the donor pool.
Outcomes are observed for T periods and the policy starts in T 0 + 1. The observed outcome vector for each country is
The observed outcome is expressed as the sum of a treatment-free potential outcome Y N j,t and the e↵ect of the treatment ↵ j,t , such that
and
where t is a time fixed e↵ect, Z j is a time-invariant vector of predictors with time-varying
is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the treated unit after T 0 and is zero otherwise, and ✏ j,t is an unobserved shock.
From periods 1 to T 0 , the treatment-free potential outcome Y N j,t should be similar to the observed outcome for both the treated and the control countries. For periods after T 0 , the treatment-free counterfactual for the treated country (Y N 1,t ) is unobserved. To estimate the treatment e↵ect for the post-intervention periods, the synthetic control approach approximates the unobserved Y N 1,t by a synthetic control unit. This control is a weighted combination of potential controls that best approximates the relevant pre-intervention characteristics of the treated country. Let the weighting vector be W = (w 2 . . . w J+1 ) 0 , where the elements are the contribution of each control country to the synthetic control unit. The weights obey the constraints w j 0 and w 2 + . . . + w J+1 = 1. The estimator of the counterfactual comes from a linear combination of the observed outcomes of the potential control regions:
The estimated treatment e↵ect for the treated country for each time period after T 0 is↵ 1,t =
According to Abadie et al. (2010) , if the weighted value of the observed covariates and pre-treatment outcomes for the control pool equals those of the treated region,
for the periods t = 1, . . . , T 0 and the outcome is a linear function of observed and unobserved potential confounders, then↵ 1,t is an approximately unbiased estimator of ↵ 1,t .
The vector W ⇤ is chosen to minimize the distance in the observed and unobserved confounders between the treated and the synthetic control country, measured before the intervention. The distance is measured according to the metric p
X 1 is a k ⇥ 1 vector including k covariates and pre-treatment outcomes for the treated region, while X 0 is the corresponding k ⇥J matrix of the control countries. V is a k ⇥k positive definite diagonal matrix which assigns weights according to the relative importance of the covariates and the pre-intervention outcomes. The choice of variables in X 0 and X 1 vectors needs to be justified on economic grounds. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) propose a procedure to determine the V matrix among all positive definite and diagonal matrices such that the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) of the outcome variable is minimized over some set of pre-intervention periods.
Empirical design and estimated controls
We select as outcomes of interest GDP per capita, capital stock per capita and TFP. Predictors are listed in table 2. Data sources and construction of the variables is explained in the appendix.
In every case, data is available since 1960.
We work with two di↵erent control groups. The first comprises countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean region, henceforth LAC countries. These countries have similar political and cultural characteristics to the treated country. 23 This group of countries make up our benchmark case. To perform a robustness check, we use a second control group that comprises all the countries in the world with data available to perform the exercise. Countries 23 A control group with countries in the same region as the treated unit is also used by Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) in a study of economic liberalization episodes. Control groups are detailed in the appendix.
In both control groups we leave out Argentina, Chile and Jamaica, which had extreme policy variations during the period, including similar policies to Peru in the case of Chile and Jamaica in the early 1970s. An important issue is the determination of the treatment year. The radical policy shift in Peru arguably started with the 1968 coup but the reforms were introduced in 1969-1974. In successive years policy swings and external factors introduced confounding factors. We explore di↵erent treatment starting dates in the appendix. The pre-treatment predictor fitness criteria as well as average post treatment losses favors a treatment year before 1974 in almost all cases, and preferably in the years 1970, 1971, or 1972 . Statistically, the starting year of treatment seems to be 1972 which happens to be the middle point of General Velasco's term.
For the following exercises we use 1970 as starting year, which follows from the main economic reforms described in section 2 and provides a conservative estimation versus 1972. We use the set of predictors in table 2 to estimate weights to approximate mean performance in the period 1960-1969, and use those weights to construct the synthetic controls. We calculate two types of weights; ADH weights are based on the standard procedure documented in Abadie et al. (2010) while the e cient BK weights are based on Becker and Klößner (2018a) . Both Hence, observed GDP is always below its synthetic after the implementation of Velasco's radical policy shift. Just at the end of the first phase of the military regime in 1975, observed GDP is 10% lower than synthetic GDP. But, as mentioned above, the core of reforms persisted across the following three administrations. By 1980, ten years after the implementation, the negative gap reached 30%. After the next five years the negative 30% GDP gap persisted.
Recall that during this 1980-1985 period the synthetic also falls.
The strongest e↵ect occurs towards 1990 (see second row of figure 3 ), when GDP dropped to only about 50% of the synthetic control. However this 1990 result may not be entirely attributed to the Velasco's treatment. Even though its core reforms persisted and shaped the fabric of economic structure up to 1990, heterodox populism of the 80's might have worsen the observed 1990 outcome. Nevertheless, it is key to highlight that the negative 50% gap compares to commonly used simple loss estimations of output loss brought about by radical policy shifts.
The first is the loss relative to a previous last GDP peak, which was recorded in 1974. The loss relative to 1974 is 37%. The second loss estimation can be performed by projecting the GDP trend observed in 1969 up to 1990. The loss relative to this trend counterfactual is about 81%.
In figure 3 we see that both methods provide evidence that the military junta's reforms, though possibly well-meaning, had persistent negative consequences. The GDP loss against both synthetic counterfactuals in every case is stark.
Significance of estimates: Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) , we also performed placebo exercises for the two estimation methods. We run the synthetic control method for each Observed − synthetic percent gap Synthetic Peru (ADH) Synthetic Peru (BK) country in the control group, one by one, as if it received the treatment. Figure 4 shows the trajectories of country GDP gaps before and after the treatment for the LAC control group.
Countries with higher gap variance before treatment are omitted from both figures.
The Peruvian fall in GDP per capita appears to be in e↵ect attributed to the specific radical policy shift observed in the country. Honduras and Bolivia also experienced extreme output falls albeit unrelated to the sort of policies implemented in Peru. The downfall in Honduras and Bolivia is stronger in the 80's due to regionwide debt problems that hit specially these two countries. Bolivia accumulated too much debt and had exchange rate and balance of payment crisis after a boom period (Kehoe et al. 2019 ). The case of Honduras is also related more to how deeply it was hit by the external shocks of the 1980's due to a vulnerable economic position. Figure 5 reports the ratios between the post-treatment root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) and the pre-treatment RMSPE for Peru and all the donor countries. Here the prediction error comes from the di↵erence between the observed GDP and its counterfactual. We expect the prediction error to be small in the pre-treatment period and to be large in the posttreatment period. In our analysis, Honduras and Bolivia for example have large post RMSPE as see in figure 4 but they also have a large pre-intervention RMSPE which means that the synthetic does not reproduce pre-treatment GDP in Honduras and Bolivia well enough.
As in Abadie et al. (2015) , we divide the post-treatment RMSPE by the pre-treatment RMSPE. Peru and Ecuador have the highest ratio reaching up to 8 times. This means that, giving this set of countries, the probability of obtaining a ratio as high as high as 8 is only about 0.13 and therefore there is support to conclude that the economic e↵ects of Velasco's radical policies on GDP are strongly negative. Indeed, it is di cult to have obtained this outcome just by chance. 
E↵ects on total factor productivity
The growth accounting exercise performed in Martinelli and Vega (2018) supports the idea that the radical reforms of the 1970s led to a misallocation of resources that led to a heavy drop in total factor productivity. The reforms a↵ected total factor productivity possibly via a crowding out of private investment stemming from increased participation of public investment that turned out less e cient. The usual sources of ine ciency of the public sector, soft budget constraints and reduced monitoring, were likely compounded by the authoritarian nature of military rule in 1968-1980. 24 Productivity in the private sector may have been a↵ected by the web of taxes and subsidies, discretionary intervention, uncertainty about property rights, and policy uncertainty. 25
To shed more light on the dynamics of total factor productivity, we perform the synthetic control approach on TFP levels at current PPP (ctfp) as provided by the Penn World Table   ( PWT). This variable is measured relative to USA TFP. We consider this variable is better suited to make cross-country comparisons than the alternative TFP at constant national prices set to unity at 2011 for all countries.
The results for the LAC control group are shown in figure 6 . The top row shows the TFP path under both methods, the synthetic TFP mildly grows over the first years of the 1970s to achieve a plateau and then to fall down during the 1980s. Instead, the observed TFP does not increase during the first half of the 1970s and starts falling sharply after 1975. The gap between the observed and both synthetic TFP levels are shown in the second row of figure 6. Even though the gap is negative after the Velasco treatment, its size is of the same order of magnitud as that observed in the pre-treatment gap. This might reflect a poor performance of the predictors during the pre-treatment period or else, that the treatment did not push PTF further down in addition to the negative external factors that hit LAC countries in the period.
In section 6 we perform the same exercise but with a larger control group. The result provides more evidence on the negative e↵ect of the reforms on total factor productivity.
Significance of TFP estimates: The evidence that the Velasco treatment did have a negative e↵ect on total factor productivity is weak in the benchmark case with LAC controls. Figure 7 shows the placebo trajectories of country TFP gaps before and after the treatment for the LAC control group. As before, countries with higher gap variance before treatment are omitted from both figures. The negative gap result is somewhat more visible in the BK case where Costa Rica and Peru have the worst performance (The Dominican Republic is not plotted because it did pass the variance threshold). Figure 8 reports the ratios between the post and the pre-treatment RMSPE for Peru and all the donor countries. The figure reveals that the negative e↵ect of the treatment in Peru is rather weak. The post-treatment RMSPE is just a bit more than the pre-treatment RMSPE.
In other words, just by looking at the small set of LAC country predictor variables, we are not able to have a good prediction for the pre-treatment period.
The robustness exercise of section 6 shows more significance to the negative e↵ect of Velasco's reforms on total factor productivity. 
E↵ects on capital stock per capita
Velasco's regime attempted to put the state "at the center of capital accumulation in a market economy" (Fitzgerald 1983) . Foreign borrowing and redirecting resources from the domestic financial sector served to finance an increase in pubic investment in oil and mining. Capital 5 1960 1970 1980 1990 Observed − counterfactual gap Synthetic Peru (ADH) Synthetic Peru (BK) Figure 9 shows the e↵ect of the radical reforms on private and general government invest- 1980, 1985 and 1990 according to this counterfactual was near 20%.
Significance of capital stock estimates: Figure 11 shows the placebo trajectories of country capital stock gaps before and after the treatment for the LAC control group. Again, countries with higher gap variance before treatment are omitted from both figures. Overall, the benchmarks results under the LAC control group show a strong GDP e↵ect, a very weak e↵ect on TFP and a mild e↵ect on capital stock.
Robustness
We use a broader set of world countries to seek for the appropriate donor countries. Figure   A -1 in the appendix illustrates the e↵ects on per capita GDP, total factor productivity and per capita capital stock. In all three cases, the e↵ect is negative. In turn, figure A-2 shows the Table 4 shows the summary of the e↵ects by each five-year period after treatment. The e↵ects are similar to those obtained with the benchmark LAC control group. For each variable and weight estimation method, we also report the p-values as proposed in Abadie et al. (2015) , which are relatively close to cero and thus, provide some evidence of the significance of the overall e↵ects.
Concluding remarks
The Peruvian military junta of 1968-1975 embarked in an ambitious attempt to refashion the economy of the country away from traditional laissez-faire policies by increasing the size of the public sector through an extensive program of nationalization and collectivization, and by command-and-control policies over the private sector. Some of military junta reforms, and in particular the importance of state-owned enterprises in the economy, were persistent.
The military junta's reforms were influenced by import substitution industrialization ideas In line with the long-term reviews of the Peruvian economy by Sheahan (1999) and Hunt (2011) , we think of the period from the 1960s to the 1980s as a stage in the (unfinished) process of the Peruvian society to find a path to growth and a better distribution. We run the synthetic control estimations treating each year since 1966 up to 1980 as a possible beginning-of-treatment year. In each case, we compute the mean squared errors of the pre-treatment gaps, which ideally should be close to zero for a good weights estimation to build the synthetic control. We also compute post-treatment mean losses for the remaining period until 1990. Post treatment mean losses can be computed all the way up to 1990 or just for the following ten years after treatment. For each instance of post-treatment loss comparisons we work with two cases according to the median or the mean values. Year of treatment mean loss after treatment BK ADH
